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學院新聞 學術動態 新聞與公告 重要新聞 學術成果

悉尼大學Erick (Zhaolin) Li 教授講座預告




主持人:徐鴻雁 教授


Robust Moral Hazard and Information Availability


主講人:Erick (Zhaolin) Li

This paper proposes a distribution-free approach to solving a moral hazard model in which a max-min principal hires an agent who selects the outcome distribution subject to moment constraints. Our formulation reveals that the model has an alternative interpretation of two-sided ambiguity where the principal and agent have opposing robust decision rules but form congruent expectations on the distribution selected by nature. The congruent expectation enables a reformulation of the problem into a linear program which provides a tractable approach to solving the robust contract without requiring Mirrlees-Rogerson conditions. The robust optimal contract is linear when the principal only knows the mean of the effort-outcome relationship. However, when the principal’s available information also includes the variance, a quadratic contract is robustly optimal and achieves the first best.



Erick (Zhaolin) Li博士畢業于賓夕法尼亞州立大學,現擔任悉尼大學商學院副教授。他的研究方向為供應鏈管理、運營管理與其它領域的交叉研究。已在《Management Science》、《Production & Operations Management》、《Decision Sciences》等運營管理領域的國際頂級期刊上發表多篇論文。

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